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Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal 
experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of 
a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the 
experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some 
philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, 
phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the 
representationalist theory, claiming that they are non-
representational states or have non-representational aspects, and 
they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue 
that these states are fully representational states of a certain kind, 
which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, 
experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never 
committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in 
the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of 
afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken 
claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in 
confusing two senses of the term “seeming”. 
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This paper deals with the question of the nature of experiential phenomena 
such as afterimages, double vision and phosphenes. When you close your 
eyes and apply pressure on them, you can experience a swirling array of 
colored dots or patches. Is this a representational mental state? Is it possible 
to say that there is a way that the world visually appears to you while 
having this experience, that is, does the experience consist in a visual 
appearance that can be judged to be truthful or misleading about the visible 
environment? Does the experience, as it were, tells you anything true or 
false about reality, does it have a truth-evaluable content? When you 
introspect, do you become aware of this experience by being aware of how 
the world qualitatively appears to be, a way which it may or may not be, 
or do you become aware of it by becoming aware of something else, say, 
some actual qualities of the mental state itself that cannot be spelled out as 
the qualities that the world appears to have? Or consider the visual 
phenomenon of double vision: Is the difference between “single” and 
double vision a difference about the representational content of these 
experiences, that is, a difference about how things look? If not, what is the 
difference? 
 
One might think that the answer is straightforward: The difference between 
double and ordinary vision is a difference between how things visually 
appear to be. In double vision, objects visually look doubled in an unusual 
way, even though we do not take them to be doubled in the great majority 
of cases. In the case where I rub my eyes and undergo a phosphene 
experience, my vision suggests me a two-dimensional ghostly world of 
chaotic colors that exist slightly behind my eyes, even though I do not 
believe that there are such colors somewhere in there or out there. Some 
reasonable philosophers disagree with this account. They claim that such 
experiences, or some aspects of these experiences, cannot be spelled out in 
terms of appearance or representation.1      
 
1 In philosophical literature, the term “appears” and its cognates have also taken on a 
separate sense which is distinct from the sense expressed by the term’s use in the context 
of an appearance-reality distinction. Such uses of the term do not necessarily imply the 
experiential state’s having truth-evaluable content, rather, the term is used to capture 
“phenomenal character”. Throughout this paper, I use “appear” and similar terms in the 
sense that implies a truth-evaluable state, as in “that box appears white to Agnes” (“X 
appears to have the property Y to subject Z”). Perhaps there is a coherent understanding of 
phenomenal character distinct from content, even though I doubt that there is, but in any 
case, my preference regarding the usage of the term confined to its narrow sense shall be 
taken as a mere terminological preference rather than a theoretical attitude towards how the 
term should be used. But for an argument that phenomenal character logically implies 
content, see Siegel (2010). 
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Representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience, in its 
stronger variety, is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a 
conscious experience are qualities that the experience non-conceptually 
represents the world to have.2 Some philosophers have argued, on the basis 
of introspective examination, that there are certain experiential states 
which are not fully representational, with afterimage experiences being the 
paradigmatic example of such states (Boghossian and Velleman 1989; 
Block 1996; Kind 2008). According to the anti-representationalist line of 
analysis, such states, or some aspects of these states, do not represent the 
world to be in a certain way. They do not have truth-evaluable content or 
intentional objects. It cannot be said that they are “about something” or 
that they are true or false. And as we can be aware of these mental states 
by introspection, the properties in virtue of which we are aware of them 
should be non-representational or non-intentional properties, and then the 
point about these special experiences are generalized to all experiences by 
some argumentative move or other. Therefore, the argument goes, 
representationalism about experience is false: There is more to experience 
than representation, and this can be revealed by an introspective analysis 
of the phenomenology of certain experiences. Introspection allegedly 
reveals “qualia” besides the representational facts about these 
experiences.3 I will assume that the reader has some acquaintance with the 
concept of a quale and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind. I will 
just leave it at mentioning that here we are dealing with qualia in the 
restricted sense of the term that applies to mental qualities 4  that are 
concretely instantiated while undergoing an experience, and not with the 
 
2 For seminal examples of representationalism, see Byrne (2001), Thau (2002), and Tye 
(2000). Representationalists of the “impure” sort (see Chalmers 2004 for the distinction) 
hold that the qualitativeness of a phenomenal experience is not only determined by the 
content of a representation but also by its “mode” or “manner”. The final verdict on pure-
versus-impure representationalism has no bearing on the debate dealt within this paper. 
3 In the times before there was a debate between qualia theory and representationalism, 
these revealed properties would be classified as “sensations” or “properties of a sensory 
field” (Peacocke 1983) or “sense-data” (Moore 1939; Jackson 1977). 
4 It has been suggested by an anonymous reviewer that “mental qualities that are concretely 
instantiated while undergoing an experience” is too weak to be rejected by 
representationalists. This would be the case if this characterization mentioned the 
instantiation of “properties” rather than “qualities”. According to representationalism, 
experience instantiates properties for sure, such as the property of representing something. 
The term “quality” is chosen here particularly to narrow down the range of properties 
instantiated in an experience that are acceptable by the representationalist, as non-
representationalist theories rely on the actual instantiations of a quality to explain the 
qualitative character of experiences, such as qualia, or qualities of sense-data, or qualities 
of the objects in the actual environment. According to representationalism, the mere 
appearance of such qualities, without any actual quality concretely existing, explains the 




term “qualia” that is sometimes used as a placeholder for whatever 
accounts for the qualitative aspect of experience.5 
 
In this paper, I argue that the experiential states that are brought forward 
as examples in such arguments for qualia are not really non-
representational states, but they are a sub-class of fully representational 
states. These are representational states the contents of which we do not 
endorse at the cognitive level, and their qualitative phenomenology is 
exhausted by the facts about how things appear, that is, by facts about what 
qualities show up in the intentional or representational content of the 
experience. By examining the claims of two defenders of the qualia view, 
Ned Block (1996) and Amy Kind (2008), I will try to show that the invalid 
argument against representationalism rests on confusing non-
representationality with what I want to call “non-endorsement of mental 
representations”. That is, these authors themselves describe such states as 
if they were non-endorsed representations, before making the logically 
illegitimate move that they are non-representational. I will also speculate 
about the causes of the confusion. I will suggest that the content of the 
experiential states deployed in such arguments differ from other non-
endorsed representations in being either obviously non-veridical or being 
impossible, and so they lose their belief-inducing function, becoming 
automatically non-endorsed states. This makes it harder to see how they 
could be true or false in the first place, as we almost never have 
environment-directed beliefs, or even explicit disbeliefs, triggered by these 
states. When this is coupled with an ambiguity in our appearance-talk, 
some of us are lead to the confused conclusion that such states are non-
representational. When we are helped out of the confusion, we see that 
there is no need to postulate qualia to analyze such states. There are, for 
sure, various arguments in defense of qualia, and the appeal to afterimages 
and the like is only one such argument. Qualia theorists, in general, can be, 
and often are, fine with the idea that there are representational aspects of 
experience and there can be a close relation between qualia and the 
representational content. But arguments that appeal to afterimages and the 
like rest on a specific phenomenological analysis of these experiences 
which aim to show that these experiences are (partly) non-representational. 
So these particular arguments for qualia shall be rendered unmotivated 
with the help of a full representationalist analysis of these experiences. 
 
 
5 According to this second meaning of “qualia”, qualia exist according to all theories of 
experience such as representationalism, direct realism and sense-data theory, though in such 
cases the term might constitute a case of terminological inflation, as talking of “experienced 
qualities” would most probably suffice. 
Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages 
 9 
Before we move on, it should be noted that to demonstrate that a mental 
state is representational, one doesn’t need to demonstrate that the 
represented qualities are represented as environmental, material or mind-
independent, or external to the body or to the subject. It is possible that 
these states represent something as immaterial, mind-dependent or mental 
(whatever “being represented as mental” may amount to), or as internal to 
the body or to the subject. They can represent objects as internal to the 
head, like right behind the eyes or on the eyes, in the ear, or somewhere in 
the head (as in the experience of internal speech and inserted thoughts). 
Representation is not only a matter of representing things in the external 
physical environment. As Byrne puts is: 
 
The subject [of an afterimage experiment] attends to the 
world as it appears to her, just as she did in the initial 
experiment [involving colored chips.] … According to some, 
it appears to the subject that a red filmy thing is some 
indeterminate distance from her eyes. According to others, it 
doesn’t appear to the subject that the object is in her physical 
environment at all: Instead it appears that the object is in some 
inner realm. However, this does not affect the point that the 
subject can only discover the phenomenal character of her 
experience by attending to the world (either external or 
internal) as her experience represents it. (Byrne 2001, 13) 
 
Also, it needn’t be the case that these representational states represent 
objects in the ordinary sense of the term “object”. It can be that they 
represent properties like color and shape without these properties being 
bound together into what some would call proper objects, so the properties 
end up being represented as properties of “areas” or “patches”.6 These 
states would still have intentional objects understood in the sense of 
“object” expressed by the term as it is used in a representational context, 
while these intentional objects may not be proper “objects” in the other 
sense of the term7 – they can belong to ontological categories such as 
 
6 Also see the related discussion in Schroer (2004). 
7 These intentional objects might even be qualities instantiated in an experience. So even if 
qualia theorists were right in analyzing experiences as states where we seem to find qualities 
instantiated in experience, there would still be some theoretical space to say that 
experiences are representational states, where our experience represent an experience as 
having a certain quality (see Thau 2002 for a similar argument). And it would require a 
separate argument for the qualia theorist to demonstrate that we should reject the 
representationalist analysis of such states in favor of an analysis that relies on concretely 
instantiated mental qualities that constitute such experiences. 
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properties and events.8 In any case, I will be arguing for the position that, 
whatever the other details about these representational states are, the 
properties being represented in visual phenomena like phosphene and 
afterimage experiences are those like color, shape and location which we 
also find in more ordinary visual states.  
 
One last terminological point I should note is that the term “representation” 
that I rely on throughout this paper does not necessarily rest on an 
externalist or relational understanding of the term found in accounts that 
analyze experiential representation as requiring some causal-informational 
relation to a concrete entity that is the represented object or property. 
 
The discussions in this paper concern a dispute between representationalists and 
qualia theorists, without touching the disagreement between representationalist 
and anti-representationalists like direct realists and sense-data theorists. 
Some of my assumptions will not be argued for and will be just taken for 
granted, and that is because it is an uncontroversial point as far as the 
debate between the representationalists and the qualia theorists is 
concerned, even though it might be found controversial by the direct 
realists and friends of sense-data. Nothing said here is aimed at persuading 
them, though perhaps the representational analysis of afterimage 
experiences and the like can provide them examples to get a grip on how 
experience in general can coherently be analyzed as a representational 
phenomenon. 
 
In the next section, I elucidate the concept of a non-endorsed representation, 
and in section three, I introduce the concept of an automatically non-
endorsed representation. In section four I offer an analysis of double vision 
as an automatically non-endorsed representation, and in section five I do 
the same for afterimages and phosphenes. In section six I borrow an 
argument from David Bourget (2015) to help demonstrate further the 
representational aspect of the aforementioned visual experience types. In 
section seven, I analyze passages from Block (1996) and Kind (2008), and 
try to show that their anti-representational arguments fail and that the 
failure is due to a confusion. Section eight investigates the psychological 
and linguistic roots of this confusion, pointing to an ambiguity in our 
appearance-talk and to special features of afterimages and the like that 
make them different from other illusory experiences that are not deployed 
for anti-representationalist arguments. The ninth section concludes the 
 
8  See Phillips for a list of features of afterimages which, according to anti-
representationalists, makes afterimages “incompatible with […] being apparent 
presentations of public objects” (2013, 418). 
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discussion, briefly hinting at similar strategies to resolve the debate about 
other allegedly non-representational states like pain and orgasm experiences. 
 
 
2. Non-Endorsed Representations 
 
Hereby I introduce the term “non-endorsed representational content”: A 
mental state has a non-endorsed representational content if it has truth-
evaluable content but the subject doesn’t take the content as true on a 
higher, cognitive level.9 This doesn’t mean that the subject necessarily 
takes the content to be false. As we will see, there are cases of non-
endorsed representations which are neither taken as true nor taken as false, 
states that have completely lost their automatic belief (or disbelief) 
inducing role and also probably have lost most of their other causal roles 
that produce intentional behavior. Maybe it would be better to coin two 
different terms for these two different phenomena, to capture the difference 
between, on the one hand, a subject explicitly disbelieving the content of 
the experience, and, on the other hand, neither explicitly believing nor 
disbelieving it, but my terminological aims will be less ambitious. And 
perhaps there can be a non-conceptual feature of phenomenal experience 
that is something like a pre-cognitive analogue of non-endorsing, but for 
the purpose of this paper, we need not enter that territory. 
 
Let me make clearer what I mean by “endorsement”. There is a type of 
endorsement which is directed at the representation itself, which requires 
the subject to understand that she is in a representational state, and to hold 
the belief that this state represents the world veridically.10 This kind of 
endorsement is presumably limited to adult human beings and perhaps 
some animals that have the concept of representation or the concept of an 
appearance-reality distinction. However, there is a more basic type of 
endorsement, which can also be applied to non-human animals and human 
infants. This kind of endorsement can be simply defined by a way that the 
world looks to a subject, and given no disturbance from an appearance-
reality distinction at the cognitive level, what appears to exist is the same 
as what is taken to exist.  
 
 
9 The concept of a non-endorsed representation has some parallels with the concept of an 
alief (Gendler 2008), but aims to capture a phenomenon at the experiential level.  
10 Of course, a subject who is not a philosopher or a cognitive scientist by profession does 
not think about her experiences via technical terms like “representation”, “content”, or 
“veridicality”, but can nevertheless think of appearances and think about whether things are 




I will leave it open whether creatures without higher-order beliefs directed 
at their own mental representations can have non-endorsed mental states 
or not, that is, whether there can be a purely non-conceptual state of non-
endorsement, but as I remarked above, nothing I will say in this paper 
hinges on this. Also, I will not be concerned with the question of whether 
all mental states need a higher-order state to become endorsed (which 
would imply that some mental states will always end up non-endorsed), 
and I will also not be concerned with the question of whether some states, 
like belief, carry a “built-in” feature of endorsement and are automatically 
endorsed unless challenged by a higher-order doubt. In the following 
discussion, I am mainly concerned with non-cognitive states such as vision 
that lose their function of inducing beliefs about things that they ordinarily 
do induce beliefs about, and that will be what I am primarily trying to 
capture with the term “non-endorsement”. 
 
The Müller-Lyer illusion is an often presented example for what I have 
called a non-endorsed representation: Two lines seem to be of different 
length due to the different direction of the arrowheads at the ends of the 
lines, but they are indeed equal. As soon as you learn that this is an illusion, 
you stop believing what is represented. But the phenomenal state still keeps 
representing the world in the way it did, it retains its visual representational 
content. This applies to all illusions the illusoriness of which we are aware 
of while undergoing them, and to pseudo-hallucinations like those had by 
subjects with Charles Bonnet syndrome. Lucid dreams and some 
hallucinogen-induced experiences are among other examples. In all these 
cases the world is represented to be in a certain way, it phenomenally 
seems to a subject that things are some way or other: That one line is longer 
than the other, that the clouds are getting twisted, or that there is a purple 
monkey in the room. However, such representations are not endorsed by 
the subject. We can ordinarily talk of such states in a way of saying “that 
looks thus and so to my eyes, but I know that it isn’t thus and so”. In these 
states of non-endorsement there is a clash between what is phenomenally 
represented and what is believed, or to put it idiomatically, one’s mind or 
senses are playing tricks on one while one is aware of the tricks.  
 
There are also some states, like imagination, which, by their nature, do not 
make us committed to endorsing their content. When you imagine a yellow 
lemon, you do not believe that there is a yellow lemon, nor you disbelieve 
that there is a yellow lemon. Imagination does not induce true or false 
beliefs, at least not the kind of belief that is targeted at something in the 
perceptible environment that should match the content of the act of 
imagination, just like a painting of a yellow lemon is not in the business of 
making you believe that there exists or doesn’t exist a yellow lemon. Still, 
like the painting, the state has an intentional object: A yellow lemon. It 
Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages 
 13 
represents a yellow lemon. By visually imagining, one forms in one’s mind 
a contentful visual state, representing objects and their properties as 
viewed from a certain perspective.11 One can find other examples, from 
standard experiences or clinical data, where the appearance content stays 
the same, but the feeling of presence, or the feeling of reality, and therefore 
the strength of endorsement, differs. 
 
The notion of a non-endorsed phenomenal representation can be elucidated 
further with similar states that are the non-sensory, cognitive counterparts 
of these representations: Sometimes we can entertain a thought, or have a 
feeling that something is the case, without believing that the content of 
these cognitive states are true (or false). We can understand someone else’s 
thoughts through her utterances without believing (or disbelieving) their 
content. By understanding the proposition expressed, and before judging 
it, we represent the world in a certain way that we don’t necessarily take to 
be true (or false).  
 
So far, I have not said anything that contradicts the qualia theory. Many 
defenders of qualia will readily acknowledge the existence of what I have 
called non-endorsed phenomenal states, as there doesn’t seem be a reason 
to deny them. And it is important to note that arguments for qualia do not 
rely on states like the Müller-Lyer illusion, at least not in a way that 
depends on an alleged non-representationality.12 But beginning with these 
phenomena will help us clarify things as we move on to more 
philosophically problematic phenomena, as I will later investigate why 
some philosophers have problems with the representational analysis of 
phenomena like double vision or afterimages, while they would grant that 
other illusions can be non-endorsed representations. Before doing that, I 
shall demonstrate that afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are 
indeed a type of non-endorsed representation, the non-endorsement of 
which results automatically rather than with theoretical reflection unlike in 




11 Imagination, of course, can have some element of endorsement, when, for instance, a 
subject imagines something to remember how it looks, and a painting, similarly, can be 
made for the purposes of inducing beliefs about how something looks, but these are not the 
necessary features of imaginings or paintings. 
12 The argument known as “the argument from illusion”, a species of “argument from 
error”, can rely on the Müller-Lyer illusion, or any other illusion or hallucination, where 
the property encountered in experience doesn’t exist in the environment, and is therefore 
allegedly instantiated in the mind. That debate is outside the scope of this paper, and it is 
often dealt with a separate counter-argument which relies on considerations related to the 




3. Automatically Non-Endorsed Phenomenal Representations 
 
In the previous section, I described non-endorsed representational states. 
These are representational states that represent the world in certain ways, 
but the veridicality of which the subject is not committed to. Now I want 
to turn to a special class of non-endorsement, a non-endorsement of an 
automatic sort which does not require conscious deliberation on the side of 
the subject regarding the illusoriness of the experience in question. My 
primary aim is to analyze the representational features of these states, and 
my remarks about how they become automatically non-endorsed should be 
taken as speculative psychology, serving here the function of helping 
elucidate the analyzed phenomena. The question of what causal 
mechanisms make these states non-endorsed is an empirical question, not 
a philosophical one. My suggestions regarding these mechanisms might 
be, and most probably are, wrong or incomplete, but these suggestions 
should serve as illustrative possibilities that shall help the reader 
understand in what way the analyzed experiential states are 
representational states, and what, in general, it means for a representational 
state to become non-endorsed. 
 
Afterimages, phosphenes, tinnitus, and psychoactive-induced experiences 
all represent the world as being in weird ways, a very fundamental 
weirdness that contradicts the basic facts we know about the physical 
world and how it interacts with our sense organs.13 Now, the content of 
other non-endorsed representations can also be weird, but I am trying to 
point to a more fundamental weirdness that is found in automatically non-
endorsed representations. I am talking about experiences the contents of 
which are so weird that we don’t even take these experiences as 
information-carrying states, and we do not even attempt to develop a 
proper vocabulary to talk about how the world looks while we are 
undergoing these states, unless a philosophical disagreement about them 
prompts us to.  
 
In the previous section, I mentioned some non-endorsed representations 
like the Müller-Lyer illusion, which the defenders of qualia do not deploy 
for their arguments. Those states differ from afterimages and the like in 
that they represent the world in rather ordinary ways. The content of such 
states can be “extraordinary” in some sense, like when a subject with 
Charles Bonnet syndrome hallucinates a bright yellow monkey in the 
room, but still, the content is ordinary when it comes to the general 
 
13 Here, I use “weird” not as a technical term that is supposed to capture a clearly defined 
common feature of these experiences, but merely as a descriptive prelude to the examples 
that follow. 
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properties represented: There appears to be a stable middle-sized object 
with a certain color, shape and location in the visible environment. The 
extraordinariness is due to some background contextual knowledge: We 
do not live in a world where bright yellow monkeys pop up in one’s room 
out of the blue. If a subject would have a strong background belief that 
monkeys with crazy colors were the kind of things that popped up in one’s 
room every now and then, then there wouldn’t be anything extraordinary 
about the content of such experiences.  
 
Similarly, when we look at cases of non-endorsement as in the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, imagination, or hallucinogen-induced experiences, we see that 
what makes these states non-endorsed is not the basic physical features 
represented by the experience. Rather, the reason for the non-endorsement 
is due either to other acquired beliefs (e.g. we know by our own or someone 
else’s measurement that the Müller-Lyer lines are actually equal) or the 
way the experience is caused (e.g. we know that we are merely imagining, 
or that we have taken hallucinogenic substances, etc.). But when it comes 
to cases like afterimages and double vision, the extraordinariness is due to 
some very fundamental physical properties things are represented to have, 
which clashes with our very basic knowledge of the perceptible 
environment and how we relate to it through our sensory organs. As we 
will shortly see, a lot of the extraordinariness seems to have something to 
do with the represented spatial features. 
  
Among the representational phenomena I will describe, I leave it to the 
reader to decide whether what is found in their content is merely weird or 
impossible. Perhaps what makes these representations automatically non-
endorsed is not our beliefs regarding the basic physical structure of the 
environment. But an incoherency within the visual content of these 
experiences that makes it the case that things just can’t be the way they 
look, that is, these representations would be non-endorsed representations 
regardless of what we believe about the environment. Whether 
phenomenal states can represent impossibilities is a controversial matter, 
but in any case, nothing much hinges on this for the purposes of this paper, 
as the extraordinariness of the content, whether impossible or not, suffices 
to elucidate the nature of the experiences to be discussed. However, the 
possibility that these states might be representing impossibilities should be 





14 For an early discussion of experiential phenomena that might represent impossibilities, 
see Crane (1988a; 1988b) and Mellor (1988). 
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4. Double Vision as an Automatically Non-Endorsed Representation 
 
Double vision represents things as double. That is, presumably, why it is 
called “double vision”. We understand what is meant when people ask each 
other “how many fingers do you see?” to find out how drunk they are. This 
representational aspect of double vision, however, has been disputed, and 
it was claimed that double vision phenomenologically differs from 
ordinary vision without differing in representational content. Boghossian 
and Velleman, for instance, have claimed that: 
 
If you press the side of one eyeball, you can see this line of 
type twice without seeing the page as bearing two identical 
lines of type. Indeed, you cannot even force the resulting 
experience into representing the existence of two lines, even 
if you try. Similarly, you can see nearby objects double by 
focusing on distant objects behind them, and yet you cannot 
get yourself to see the number of nearby objects as doubling. 
(Boghossian and Velleman 1989, 94) 
 
What I will aim to do in this section is to convince the reader that the 
phenomenology described by Boghossian and Velleman above is better 
analyzed as a case of non-endorsed representation of doubleness.15 
 
We can begin to demonstrate the representational aspect of double vision 
with the help of anecdotal examples where the illusion actually works: 
Once I was standing by the side of a dark road, and saw the headlights of 
a vehicle approaching. There were, apparently, two headlights, and they 
were the only visible parts of the vehicle. Given that vehicles with two 
headlights are cars or trucks, I thought it was a car or truck approaching. 
However, I was subject to alcohol-induced double vision. There was in 
reality only one headlight, but it visually seemed to me that there were two. 
As the vehicle drove closer, the two apparent headlights collapsed into a 
single headlight, and I realized that it was not a car or a truck, but a 
motorbike.  
 
This is a rare example where the representation of there being two things 
is endorsed by the subject, as the overall visual state in this example 
doesn’t have some of the peculiarities of most double vision experiences. 
The only represented objects in the whole visual field are two headlights 
surrounded by darkness, while in most double vision experiences in better 
light we are presented with a wholly doubled world, with things spatially 
overlapping with each other in a strange way, while we can identify the 
 
15 Also see Tye (2003) for a counter-argument to Boghossian and Velleman. 
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two apparent instances of the doubled thing as the same thing. In such 
cases, it is easy to see one reason why the representation is never endorsed, 
as there is something logically awkward about one thing being two: Two 
things are conceptually identified as the same thing in many occurrences 
of double vision, possibly because we know that there is only one thing, 
and unlike in the headlights case above, we see the “two things” as 
somehow superimposed. When we see something double, we see one thing 
(on the cognitive or conceptual level of representation) as double (on the 
visual level of representation.) There are also spatial peculiarities about 
how the two things are represented: Their locations can be identified in 
relation to each other, say, one being on the left, but still, it is not like the 
two things are taking up space in the same three-dimensional spatial field. 
They are usually partly superimposed in an unusual, ghostly way. That is 
quite different from how we ordinarily experience the world to be and how 
we think it actually is.  
 
Perhaps the causal history of how we get these experiences also contributes 
to the automatic non-endorsement of these representations. Most of the 
time, we know that causes of double vision come from inside and not from 
the world being really that way; it is either due to consumption of alcohol 
or some other substance, or due to a failure to focus. However, our 
knowledge regarding the causes of the experience might not be a necessary 
factor for the non-endorsement; we can speculate that the spatial way 
things are represented is most probably sufficient. Because of the 
peculiarities of the content we find it difficult to see how double vision 
could be endorsed in the first place, how to even exactly describe the 
spatial properties objects should have for this appearance to be truthful. 
The disregard is so automatic that the relevant feature of the representation 
loses its belief-triggering function at the cognitive, non-experiential level 
(except for occasionally triggering beliefs about the contents of one’s 
visual experiences). Still, what separates double vision from ordinary 
vision is a representational fact, no matter how weird that represented 






16 Bourget (2015) suggests that the difficulty we might have with very clearly articulating 
the contents of such experiences might be due to the limitations of our concepts relating to 
their phenomenology, and why we have these limitations might be due to the fact that we 
are not interested in communicating them, as the representational contents that make these 




5. Phosphenes and Afterimages as Automatically Non-Endorsed 
Representations 
 
Phosphenes and various other closed-eye visuals are examples of visual 
phenomena which are sometimes described in English via phrases like “the 
play of shadow and light”, or “booming-buzzing confusion” for more 
anarchic cases. A world of unstable, two-dimensional chaotic colored 
patches is much different than the world we are accustomed to seeing, 
which is a world of stable, middle-sized, three-dimensional objects that 
behave in broadly predictable ways. Some might be tempted to say that 
these chaotic visual experiences are not “world-suggestive”, but this would 
only amount to saying that they do not suggest a world that we are familiar 
with, and not that these experiences do not suggest a world at all. There 
could be such worlds, after all. Some artists try to depict them, and some 
photographers find little worlds in nature that look like psychedelic closed-
eye visuals and draw our attention to the similarity, like natural patterns on 
a stone, or the northern lights. Lycan similarly suggests that “[…] given 
any visual experience […] there is some technological means of producing 
a veridical qualitative equivalent—e.g. a psychedelic movie shown to a 
subject in a small theater” (Lycan 1987, 90). However, as Schroer (2004, 
536) also notes, we don’t need to put things this way in order to point to 
the representational nature of these experiences. It might be the case that 
there is no technological means to produce a veridical equivalent of these 
experiences, just like there is no technological means to produce the 
veridical equivalent of a belief in a magical wand, a round square, or the 
world of double vision. What is represented might be a nomological or 
logical impossibility.17 
 
As in the case of double vision, there might be factors other than the 
content that might be playing a role in the automatic non-endorsement of 
this kind of experiences. We have experiences of phosphenes and 
afterimages from childhood on. We are not surprised by such experiences 
and we do not ever wonder if they are truthful. We know how to get them, 
and how we get them is not by orienting ourselves towards some 
perceptible external object to be explored by sight, but by playing around 
with our visual apparatus, say, by closing our eyes and rubbing them. 
Moreover, the spatial properties of these experienced objects make it 
impossible for them to be objects that can be explored by ordinary visual 
means – at least for phosphenes, which are not represented to be in front 
 
17  Indeed, Lycan is probably wrong in suggesting that a veridical equivalent of these 
experiences can be produced in a movie theater, because that perceived scene would be in 
front of the subject and experienced as such, while some of these experiences represent 
their objects as being somewhat located inside the eyes of the subject, while at the same 
time representing properties we see with our eyes. 
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of the eyes, but rather on something like, as it were, an internal screen 
which has some of the characteristics of the ordinary visible environment, 
like color, shape and location.18  
 
Afterimages require a more complicated analysis when it comes to their 
experienced location, as they are usually experienced with eyes open, but 
still linger when you close your eyes. They can switch between being “out 
there” and being on an “internal screen”. Afterimages also seem to occlude 
other things in the visual field (which, by the way, is another fact that 
should make it clear that having an afterimage is a modification of how the 
perceptible environment is represented.) These represented spatial 
properties probably constitute the most important factor for these 
experience’s being automatically non-endorsed.  
 
In order to point out that these experiences are representational or 
intentional, some philosophers have pointed at the fact that we can talk 
about them by using the vocabulary we use to describe ordinary 
phenomena perceptible by vision, like color, size and location. Tye claims 
that a red afterimage backed by a yellow background is “similar perhaps 
to that of viewing (in dim lighting) a bloodstain on a transparent sheet of 
glass suspended between oneself and a yellow background surface” (Tye 
2000, 85), while Schroer provides an anecdotal example of an endorsed 
afterimage experience he had while fixing a lightbulb, where he  
 
immediately took the object to be a red beanbag. […] It did 
not occur to me that there really was no beanbag and that I 
was merely having an afterimage experience until I looked 
away from the table and the object in question suddenly 
moved and changed in several very unexpected ways. 
(Schroer 2004, 543) 
 
Phillips, meanwhile, proposes that afterimage experiences are best 
described as “illusory presentations of light phenomena often apparently 
projected from the subject’s point of view” (2013, 433). 
 
The above examples help demonstrate that these experiences are 
representational, but we should keep in mind that these examples are not 
strictly necessary: It is a possibility that the content of a representational 
 
18 An auditory analogue of these visual experiences might be tinnitus, or “ringing-in-the-
ear”, though it is a somewhat weaker case of automatically non-endorsed representation, as 
they are more commonly endorsed, especially if the tinnitus experience is a novel 
experience for the subject and she genuinely believes that there is a source of sound 
somewhere inside her ear. Some tinnitus experiences, after all, are veridical experiences of 
a sound produced in the ear. 
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experience may not be similar to anything that can be veridically 
represented, or for some experiences it can be the case that there are 
absolutely no cases where the experience is taken to be veridical. Also, if 
our aim is to provide anecdotal examples to make a case for the 
contentfulness of these experiences, we don’t need to search for cases 
where the experience is taken to be veridical, as it will do equally good to 
find cases where it is taken to be illusory, since the claim of the anti-
representationalist is that these states are neither veridical nor illusory, as 
these are, allegedly, not contentful states at all. 
 
Another way to demonstrate the representational nature of these 
experiences is to think of situations where an automatically non-endorsed 
representation regains its belief-inducing role. Floater experiences provide 
us with an example to use as a nice springboard for this purpose. Floaters 
are specks in one’s eyes which are normally transparent, but may become 
visible due to degeneration in the eyes, which makes subjects experience 
these specks as floating in front of, or inside, one’s eye. Floaters are 
especially vivid against a white or monochromatic background, and they 
move along with one’s gaze. Some of the spatial properties of floaters 
make them similar to other visual noise like afterimages. Indeed, when I 
first learned about them, I was surprised to hear that experiencing a floater 
is a type of veridical perception, as I have always thought that they were a 
species of visual illusion created by the condition of my eye. When I 
acquired this information, floater experiences regained their object-
targeted belief-inducing function (replacing the occasionally induced 
belief that there is something wrong with my visual system because I am 
experiencing illusory patches). 
  
Floater experiences initially lose their belief-inducing function most 
probably because floaters are spatially similar to the patches experienced 
in other visual illusions like afterimages (having a strange location, moving 
along with the eye, etc.), and because one cannot behaviorally interact with 
a floater any more than one can interact with an afterimage, besides moving 
them along with one’s gaze. One cannot touch or hold a floater, or visually 
investigate it by further usual means.  
 
Floaters are not the kind of phenomena that are brought up in defense of 
the qualia theory, so why did I bring up this example? Because floaters 
constitute a real-world example to think of how other non-endorsed 
representations could regain their belief-inducing function. Think of a 
scenario where visual scientists discover that, like floaters, phosphenes are 
actual colored patches that temporarily exist in your eye, or think of a naïve 
person getting fooled into believing that in phosphene experiences, she 
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experiences colored things in a parallel reality inaccessible to others,19 or 
rare real-life cases like retinal detachment (discussed in Gow 2019 in the 
context of the representationalism-qualia dispute) where subjects undergo 
phosphene experiences with eyes open and initially take the phosphenes to 
be actual flashes of color and light. The fact that we can coherently imagine 
these scenarios should help us understand that these experiences have 
visual representational content of a non-endorsed type.20 
 
 
6. Bourget’s Argument from the Loss of Visual Information 
 
Before moving on, I will briefly look at an argument by Bourget (2015) 
where he similarly argues for representationalism for cases which he 
classifies as cases of visual distortion, including double vision and blur. 
Bourget invites us to consider cases of ordinary vision, such as seeing a 
 
19  Several philosophers have recently suggested that some phosphene experiences are 
instances of veridical perception. Based on empirical work by Salari et al. (2017), among 
others, Ben-Yami (unpublished) suggests that in some cases “the phosphenes perceived are 
due to ultraweak bioluminescent photon emission of cells in the visual system”, and Ali 
(2018) makes a similar claim that some phosphenes are generated internally, basing this 
claim on Davis et al. (1976). Perhaps these findings could also be interpreted as the 
electromagnetism produced by the eye causing illusory experiences rather than us 
veridically perceiving electromagnetism produced by the eye, but I will not discuss this 
here, for the examples discussed by the above authors involve only some types of 
phosphenes (such as those experienced in a dark room), and if it is indeed true that we 
veridically experience something in these experiences, this can be accommodated within a 
representationalist framework: They are veridical representations. The qualia theorist, on 
the other hand, should provide a strong argument to the effect that the veridical experience 
claim is confused: That the scientific evidence cannot be interpreted in such a way because, 
according to the qualia theory, we cannot make sense of phosphene experiences being 
veridical, as phenomenological reflection allegedly shows that these experiences lack 
intentional objects or representational contents. 
20 An anonymous reviewer has suggested that even if the endorsement/non-endorsement 
framework is on the right track, there is still the possibility that the difference between 
endorsement and non-endorsement is due to a change in phenomenal character without a 
change in content. This, however, is not possible, given that the notions of endorsement and 
non-endorsement are, by stipulation, cognitive notions related to the formation of beliefs or 
belief-like states. Perhaps my analyses in this paper are wrong and there is nothing in the 
mental realm that can be captured by the notions of endorsement and non-endorsement, but 
if there are, then by definition endorsement and non-endorsement refer to content-related 
differences. At best, there might be a phenomenal difference between endorsement and 
non-endorsement, alongside representational and functional differences, if there is a 
phenomenology specific to various cognitive states. The question of whether that 
phenomenological difference can be captured by representational terms or not would be a 
general question regarding the cognitive phenomenology of all experiences, because all 
experiences are either endorsed or non-endorsed, and the question would be out of the scope 
of this paper, as this paper takes up issue with the claim that particularly afterimage 
experiences and the like are resistant to a representationalist analysis for reasons specific to 
these type of experiences. 
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square, and then think of a series of cases where the visual effect (blur, 
double vision, etc.) is gradually amplified, and draws our attention to the 
fact that in cases of higher distortion, it is obvious that there is an 
impoverishment in the representational content of the experience (e.g. we 
cannot see a square as a square anymore as the blur or double vision gets 
extremely amplified.) The cases of extreme distortion are not everyday 
cases of perceptual distortion, but Bourget asks: If, the phenomenal 
character is independent from the content in mild cases of distortion as 
anti-representationalists argue, then at what point does the content get 
intertwined with the phenomenal character of a distorted experience as the 
distortion gets amplified? Bourget concludes that all possible answers to 
this question are implausible and/or ad hoc.  
 
I do think that this presents an interesting case against anti-
representationalism for double vision and blur. The primary reason I bring 
up Bourget’s argument, however, is that it provides an interesting 
phenomenological exercise for the qualia theorist that could help her 
understand in what way the allegedly non-representational aspects of 
experience are actually representational, and help her have a better grasp 
of what it means for a state to be automatically non-endorsed. Imagining a 
gradual transition from ordinary to extreme cases can help one see that 
ordinary cases also involve a loss of visual information, even though the 
information that is lost might be little. The exercise should also help us see 
why we do not prefer to have these distorted experiences, that is, why we 
avoid them. If what makes an experience an experience of double vision 
or an afterimage had nothing to do with the representational content, then 
our preference regarding whether to have these experiences or not would 
merely be a cosmetic preference, it would be a preference regarding which 
“mental paint” we would like our experiences to be painted with: Whether 
we would strive to be or not to be in such visual states would depend, 
perhaps, on which phenomenology we enjoy more, and not on whether we 
prefer to see the world as it is or see it in a distorted manner. One can, of 
course, from time to time, prefer to have these experiences, mainly for 
phenomenological curiosity or merely to enjoy a certain experience. Some 
children, philosophers, cognitive scientists, and recreational users of 
psychedelic substances do occasionally strive to have experiences of visual 
distortion. But for the sake of seeing the visible environment clearly and 
as it is (rather than blurrily or doubly), these experiences are experiences 
that we prefer to avoid, because their representational content is distorted. 
We, of course, rarely complain about ordinary experiences of afterimages 
or double vision, because they are temporary and mild. But imagining 
extreme cases of these visual distortions should make it more obvious why 
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it is not preferable to have these experiences for epistemic reasons, and 
therefore make it obvious that they have representational content.21 
 
 
7. Confusing Non-Representationality with Non-Endorsement 
 
I hope I have so far established that double vision, phosphenes and 
afterimages can be analyzed as non-endorsed representational states, and 
this non-endorsement is an automatic one in great majority of cases. Now 
I wish to demonstrate that some defenders of qualia confuse non-
endorsement with non-representationality when talking about these 
experiences.  
 
In his Mental Paint and Mental Latex, Ned Block suggests that 
“[Afterimages] don’t look as if they are really objects or as if they are really 
red. They look … illusory” (Block 1996, 32; ellipsis in original). He uses 
this observation in support of non-representationality of such experiences, 
and therefore the existence of qualia: In such experiences, it cannot be the 
representational content that is responsible for the qualitative 
phenomenology we are introspectively aware of, so it should be a non-
representational property such as a quale (or “mental paint”) which 
constitutes that phenomenology, such as qualities instantiated in 
experiences.22 Interestingly, Block argues for the anti-representationalist 
conclusion via mentioning illusoriness, which is a feature of representations. 
 
21 The phenomenon of blurry vision is outside the scope of this paper, but I will just mention 
in passing that the information-degrading nature of experiences of blur should be pretty 
obvious even without considering extreme cases. It is part of the daily visual experience of 
many people with eye problems, and a rather undesirable one.  
22 This definition of qualia or mental paint as non-representational might seem to go against 
the definitions of some qualia theorists that define these properties as representational, in 
the sense that these properties are vehicles of representation, as when Block says mental 
paint is the “mental properties of the experience that represent the redness of a tomato” 
(Block 1996, 29). Mental paint can be a “representational” property in the sense that it can 
serve representational functions, though it can also be instantiated without representing 
anything. When I define these properties as “non-representational”, what I mean is that 
these properties are neither represented properties, nor the property-of-representing-
something. If there is no mental paint, introspection can only reveal which property is 
represented, along with the fact that the subject is in a representational state (and perhaps, 
if impure representationalism is true, introspection can reveal some other properties like 
representational “modes”), but it does not reveal properties that do the representation in the 
way that one looks at a painting and becomes aware of the paint. Block claims that what is 
found by introspection in afterimage experiences is neither the represented property, nor 
the property of something being represented, but only mental paint, and in this sense mental 
paint is non-representational. Contrary to Block, I claim that analyzing an afterimage 
experience gives us only representational properties: Introspection reveals the fact that one 




I take it that the ordinary understanding of visual illusion is the following: 
Something visually seems to be a certain way, but it is not really that way. 
But what would it mean to say that afterimages “look illusory”, or that 
“afterimages don’t look as if they are really red”? It is easy to understand 
what it means to say that something does not look red, but what about 
something’s “not looking really red”? Whatever Block means by that, he 
seems to talk about something that looks or does not look some way or 
other, which means that the experience has an intentional object that is 
represented to be some way or other. The statement about an object’s “not 
looking really red” is a statement about how it looks, how it appears to be. 
In more technical terms, that is how an object is represented by the 
experience.  
 
And what about “looking illusory”? Does Block mean that there is a brute 
represented feature of “unrealness” or “illusoriness” attached to these 
represented objects or properties at a pre-cognitive level?23 If we could 
make sense of this, and if it were indeed the case, the state would still be a 
representational one: Redness is represented, and it is represented as 
“unreal”. Or does Block mean that something looks illusory in the sense 
that the way that thing is represented makes it unlikely that it is real, 
because of the weird or contradictory properties it is represented to have, 
so it “looks illusory” at a judgmental level? If we follow this interpretation, 
we should take Block as implying that the object of the experience is 
represented in such a way that it cannot be real, or we automatically know 
that it is not real. But neither interpretation can help one reach an anti-
representationalist conclusion about afterimage experiences, because in 
both interpretations “illusoriness” is understood as a representational 
phenomenon.   
 
Perhaps, one might think, in order to interpret Block properly, we should 
turn to what an illusion is supposed to be according to qualia theory. Qualia 
can be thought of as vehicles of representation that do the representing. A 
certain quale’s instantiation makes the mind represent a certain property. 
How this representational feature is to be understood depends on the details 
of the theory. According to externalist theories, a quale represents 
something in virtue of the instantiation of that quale’s being in some 
causal-informational relation with instances of the represented property. A 
“red quale” represents redness (or some other property of red-looking 
objects, if one is an anti-realist about colors) in virtue of being reliably 
 
23 An anonymous reviewer has suggested that this is possibly the correct interpretation, as 
Block describes afterimages (more particularly, an afterimage’s changing size) as 
“somehow unreal or unobjective” in his more recent work (2010, 54). This suggestion 
might be on the right track, but for the purposes of this paper, it is useful to explore all the 
possible interpretations of Block’s original remark, and follow where they theoretically go.   
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triggered by redness (and by fulfilling some other conditions depending on 
the details of the theory). According to internalist theories of representation 
that rely on qualia, a “red quale” represents redness either in a projectivist 
manner, where subjects mistakenly take these experiential qualities to be 
the qualities of external objects (and form a useful but erroneous 
representation of the world with the help of qualia and the act of 
projection), or somehow end up representing red-looking objects if the 
experiences, somehow, acquire a representational aspect which signals that 
these experiences are caused by external things. In all of these theories, 
illusion is a state where a quale is instantiated, but the thing it is supposed 
to represent is not there. If the qualia theorist wants to claim that an 
afterimage experience is the bare awareness of a quale-complex, without 
any representation going on, “illusoriness” is not the concept to be alluded 
to in order to demonstrate that. Such a state would be neither veridical, nor 
illusory. A qualia-theoretical analysis of an afterimage experience can be 
given without appealing to illusoriness, by saying that “when we introspect 
an afterimage experience, we find a mentally-instantiated quality, which 
does not represent anything”. This formulation would not face the 
problems that the illusion formulation faces, but it faces other problems: It 
has no appeal for people who, introspecting an afterimage experience, find 
no qualities other than those like colors that objects appear to have also in 
uncontroversially representational experiences, which makes it natural to 
think of afterimages as a special type of misrepresentation. 
 
Is there perhaps some reason, that introspection can provide us, which 
would urge us to conceptualize afterimages differently, in a way that 
involves qualia? Let’s turn to Amy Kind, who, in her article How to Believe 
in Qualia, gives us instructions to find qualia in afterimage experiences:  
 
In general, afterimages occur subsequent to the removal of 
some original (usually intense) stimulus. When a camera flash 
goes off, you might experience an afterimage in front of the 
photographer’s face. If you stare intently at a bright light for 
a little while and then close your eyes, there will be a lingering 
glow in the darkness. And if you stare at a green dot for half 
a minute and then shift your attention to a bright white piece 
of paper, you will visually experience a red dot similar in size 
and location to the green dot you had been staring at. But in 
none of these cases does it seem as if the afterimage represents 
something that is really there. When you close your eyes after 
looking at the bright light, for example, you don’t take the 
lingering glow to be on the inner surface of your eyelids. 
When you see the red afterimage against the white page, you 
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don’t take the redness to suggest the existence of a red dot on 
the page. (Kind 2008, 289) 
 
Kind puts the bottom line with the aforementioned quote by Block, where 
he mentions the illusoriness of afterimages. Note that Kind talks about 
these allegedly non-representational experiences by mentioning the same 
kind of experienced phenomena found also in ordinary experiences: Both 
before and after looking at the bright light and then turning away, we 
experience brightness, referred to as a “glow” by Kind; after staring at the 
green dot, we see a “red dot similar in size and location to the green dot” 
we have been staring at. Kind holds that these experiences are not 
representational: Unlike the experience we have when we are looking at a 
green dot, which represents a green dot, the corresponding afterimage does 
not represent a red dot. But isn’t this claim of non-representationality 
contradictory to what Kind says, that we experience a red dot? Isn’t the 
red dot the intentional object of the experience? Can we coherently assert 
that we “experience a red dot” while it is the case that a red dot is not 
represented, that it doesn’t visually seem to us that there is a dot which is 
red? I think not. If we experience a red dot, it follows that it seems to us 
that there is a red dot. “Seeming” is of course used here in the pre-cognitive 
(or “non-conceptual”) sense, in a way that allows us to say “it seems to me 
[in the first sense of “seeming”: it seems to my eyes] that there is a red dot, 
but it doesn’t seem to me [in the second sense of “seeming”: I don’t judge] 
that it is real”. 
 
I think what is going on here is a confusion, taking non-endorsed 
representations as non-representational. Saying that a non-representational 
state is illusory, as Block does, or saying that we experience something 
without that something being the object of experience, as Kind does, is a 
contradictory way of talking. In some experiences, of course it can appear 
to us that the experienced thing doesn’t exist, if things can “look illusory” 
in some sense, but that would also create no motivation to postulate the 
existence of mental qualities to account for the experience, as those 
experienced qualities don’t seem to exist. Merely intentional qualities of 
merely intentional objects that figure in the representational content would 
do the job, or to put it another way, the fact that things seem a certain way, 
that there seems to be an “illusory redness”, can fully account for the 
qualitative phenomenology.   
 
 
8. Possible Causes of the Confusion 
 
In the previous section, I made an attempt to show that Block and Kind 
confuse two different phenomena, an experience’s being non-representational 
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and its being a non-endorsed representation. Now I want to investigate the 
psychological and linguistic causes of this confusion. What makes some of 
us prone to making this logically invalid move? I speculate that one 
determining factor here might be a verbal ambiguity in some expressions 
related to mental representation, expressions in the form of “it seems to me 
that X” or “it appears to me that X”. As I have mentioned earlier, one can 
talk of seeming in a cognitive way, as opposed to a visual/experiential way, 
as in phrases like “it seems to me that…” followed by a clause that 
expresses a proposition associated with a belief or belief-like state. So 
when you are in a visual state where the world in front of you seems to you 
to have such and such objects and properties, it is still possible that it 
doesn’t seem to you, in the cognitive sense, that there are such objects and 
properties: Your mind is in two conflicting representational states at two 
different levels, and you endorse the higher, cognitive one. Even though at 
the end of the day the world doesn’t include a red patch according to you, 
the cognizing subject, there is a red patch in front of you according to your 
visual system.24 The logical fallacy lies in the following move: Starting 
with the premise that the world doesn’t seem to be like this or that to you 
at the cognitive level, and moving to the conclusion that it doesn’t seem to 
be like this or that to you at all. 
 
But why don’t we come across a similar fallacy when it comes to other 
non-endorsed visual states, like the Müller-Lyer illusion? I suggest that the 
answer can be found in the difference between how the visual state at hand 
becomes non-endorsed. If the illusoriness of the visual state is not so 
phenomenally obvious, and when we reflect on these experiences, we form 
higher-order beliefs that take as data the visual state already 
conceptualized as a representational state, and when we come to know 
about the illusoriness, we are in a state of explicit disbelief. To put it 
another way, when we are looking at the Müller-Lyer lines, understanding 
that we are in an illusory visual state involves, first of all, understanding 
that we are in a representational visual state, a state with a truth-evaluable 
content, and understanding that the content is false. So, no one would argue 
for qualia for a state like the Müller-Lyer illusion on the grounds of non-
representationality, as this state causes explicit belief or disbelief in us, and 
having explicit belief or disbelief that takes visual appearances as data 
means that we are aware of the visual representational state as a 
representational state. (It is called an “illusion”, after all.) But we rarely 
have explicit belief or disbelief in cases of afterimages or phosphenes. The 
 
24  Here I don’t mean to say that your visual system is an independently conscious 
homunculus. It is just that in cases of non-endorsement you distance yourself from how 
things look to you as represented by your visual system, and endorse your cognitive, 
judgmental representations about the environment.  
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factor that would prevent a similar fallacy in the Müller-Lyer illusion case 
is missing from the cases of automatic non-endorsement.   
 
One could argue that I am not being charitable here to Kind and Block, and 
say that even though they might be mistaken, they are not confused: Maybe 
I shouldn’t take their descriptions of these states at face value. Let’s follow 
this suggestion and try to read Block and Kind in a way that wouldn’t make 
them contradict themselves.  
 
As for Block’s way of putting things, it is hard to come up with a charitable 
reading. How can a talk of “illusoriness” be translated into non-
representational talk? I do not know. However, there can be prospects for 
charity for some aspects of Kind’s description of afterimages. When 
talking about qualia, it is common that theorists use terms that are normally 
used to talk about represented properties, like when some philosophers say 
things like “a red-quale”. By this, they don’t mean that a certain quale is 
itself red, or that it necessarily represents redness. What is meant here is 
that the quale is the sort of quale we find in experiences that ordinarily 
represent redness. Also, it could be that when these philosophers talk of 
experience in a way where the grammar suggests an act-object structure, 
we shouldn’t accuse them of failing to recognize that if a state such as an 
afterimage experience is supposed to be non-representational then it cannot 
have an act-object structure. Maybe when Kind says that “you might 
experience an afterimage in front of the photographer’s face”, she uses 
“experience” in the same way when we say that we “experience joy”, 
where joy is not (or not so obviously is) the intentional object of the 
experience.  
 
If this charitable reading is correct, then all of what Kind says should in 
principle be translatable to non-intentional qualia talk. According to this 
translation, in the above sentence, “afterimage” doesn’t refer to the 
intentional object of the experience. Rather, the whole phrase 
“experiencing an afterimage” refers to a non-intentional mental state, as in 
“experiencing joy” (conceptualized for the sake of the argument as a non-
intentional mental state), even though the “an” in “an afterimage” sets off 
some alarms: We can experience two afterimages at the same time, but can 
we experience “two joys” at the same time? Perhaps, and perhaps not, but 
in any case the parallelism already seems suspicious.  
 
In any case, even if a non-intentional reading of “experiencing an 
afterimage” is possible, what to do with “an afterimage in front of the 
photographer’s face”? My mental state is not in front of the photographer’s 
face. Well, if “an afterimage” refers to an experience, and mental state 
tokens are identical to neural state tokens, and I am in front of the 
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photographer, then perhaps my experience is in front of the photographer’s 
face in a sense, but this is obviously not what is meant by the phrase. 
Maybe we should understand it in the same way we are supposed to 
understand red-talk about qualia: Just like there can be red-afterimages in 
the sense that they instantiate a quale that we also find in red-representing 
states, there can be in-front-of-the-photographer’s-face-afterimages, where 
we find the type of qualia, presumably shape and location related qualia, 
that our minds are supposed to instantiate when looking at faces or face-
shaped objects. This translation doesn’t seem impossible, but nevertheless, 
as Kind is describing an environmental situation that causes us to have 
afterimages, and our experience of the photographer’s face, unlike the 
afterimage, is uncontroversially representational, it is much more plausible 
to read “in front of the photographer’s face” as referring to nothing other 
than a spatial property related to the photographer’s face as it is represented 
by the experience. So, after all, there visually appears to be something in 
front of the photographer’s face.  
 
Kind can insist that this natural reading is not correct, and the qualia-
theoretical analysis is the correct description of the situation. But we 
should remember that Kind’s article is titled “How to Believe in Qualia”, 
and it is aimed at the reader who doesn’t believe in qualia yet, or may not 
even have the concept of a quale, but who will be made to believe in qualia 
after following some instructions. So the initial steps of the description of 
the mental state and the description of the environmental factors that 
trigger it should not have references to qualia until the reader stumbles 
upon the relevant property by following the introspective steps. It would 
be surprising if Kind was expecting the uninitiated reader to translate this 
in-front-of-the-photographer’s-face-talk into qualia-talk. More plausibly, 
what she is doing is just describing a non-endorsed representational state, 
with ordinary language that refers to represented objects and properties, 
such as the photographer’s face and an illusory glow in front of it.  
 
Perhaps there is a way that Kind could provide us a with a complete qualia-
theoretical interpretation of the way she describes the afterimage 
experience that could get around the above objections, so maybe I am 
mistaken in attributing her a confusion. But that still wouldn’t make the 
qualia theory more appealing. There is, after all, no apparent reason why 
we should interpret the ordinary talk of afterimages in such a complicated 
fashion and prefer the qualia view for a philosophical analysis of the mind. 
We have a simpler analysis which treats these states as illusions of an 
automatically non-endorsed sort, an analysis that applies to ordinary talk 
of afterimages, a talk which sounds linguistically the same as Kind’s 
description of afterimages, but still makes sense without being translated 
into something very complicated that allegedly lies beneath the surface 
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linguistic form and that relies on a property called qualia that we have 
independent reasons to be suspicious of. 
 
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
 
There are several other kinds of experiential phenomena, experiences with 
affective aspects like pain and orgasm, which are also among the 
armaments of the anti-representationalist. I want to briefly point to the 
similarity of these phenomena to the cases discussed above. These states 
might also be among the states which sometimes lose their belief-inducing 
function regarding the veridicality of their contents, not because they 
represent impossibilities or oddities, but because we care more about the 
very existence of these experiential states than their veridicality, as feeling 
pain on a real arm is as undesirable as feeling pain on a phantom arm.25 I 
will not provide a defense of representationalism about pain and orgasm 
along these lines here as it is beyond this paper’s scope, and leave it at 
pointing at hints for this strategy found in the literature (see the discussion 
in Aydede 2009, sections 3.2 and 4.2). But if this initial line of thought is 
on the right track, in the future it can provide us with an explanation of the 
confusion of the anti-representationalist in the case of affective states as 
well.    
 
In any case, I hope what I have argued above makes a case for 
representationalism for afterimage-like experiences. These experiences are 
automatically non-endorsed representations confusedly taken to be non-
representational states by some defenders of qualia, and when we examine 
the way they define these states, we see that they are actually talking about 
these experiences as if these states were a type of illusion, that is, a type of 
mental representation with truth-evaluable appearance content. And their 
representational nature makes the postulation of qualia unnecessary. They 
represent the world in certain ways, and if the represented qualities are not 
in the world, then they need not be instantiated in the mind or anywhere 
else. They simply do not exist. Afterimages and the like do not trigger 
explicit belief or disbelief at the cognitive level, but the lack of a 
representation at the cognitive level is not an obstacle to a representationalist 
analysis at the non-conceptual visual level. Compare with visual 
imagination: Imagination is also a representational state, and visually 
imagining a red patch does not make you believe or disbelieve that there is 
 
25  By “caring about the very existence of these experiential states rather than their 
veridicality” I do not mean that we care about some non-representational or non-intentional 
aspects of these states. We care about pain experiences because of the object of experience, 
the felt pain quality. 
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a red patch, while still being a representational state which has a 
phenomenal character that is exhausted by the qualities of what it is an 
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